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Abstract
Social media has brought a revolution on how people are consuming news. Be-
yond the undoubtedly large number of advantages brought by social-media plat-
forms, a point of criticism has been the creation of echo chambers and filter bub-
bles, caused by social homophily and algorithmic personalization.
In this paper we address the problem of balancing the information exposure in
a social network. We assume that two opposing campaigns (or viewpoints) are
present in the network, and that network nodes have different preferences towards
these campaigns. Our goal is to find two sets of nodes to employ in the respec-
tive campaigns, so that the overall information exposure for the two campaigns
is balanced. We formally define the problem, characterize its hardness, develop
approximation algorithms, and present experimental evaluation results.
Our model is inspired by the literature on influence maximization, but we offer
significant novelties. First, balance of information exposure is modeled by a sym-
metric difference function, which is neither monotone nor submodular, and thus,
not amenable to existing approaches. Second, while previous papers consider a
setting with selfish agents and provide bounds on best response strategies (i.e.,
move of the last player), we consider a setting with a centralized agent and pro-
vide bounds for a global objective function.
1 Introduction
Social-media platforms have revolutionized many aspects of human culture, among others, the way
people are exposed to information. A recent survey estimates that 62% of adults in the US get their
news on social media [20]. Despite providing many desirable features, such as, searching, personal-
ization, and recommendations, one point of criticism is that social media amplify the phenomenon
of echo chambers and filter bubbles: users get less exposure to conflicting viewpoints and are iso-
lated in their own informational bubble. This phenomenon is contributed to social homophily and
algorithmic personalization, and is more acute for controversial topics [2, 12, 13, 16, 18].
In this paper we address the problem of reducing the filter-bubble effect by balancing information
exposure among users. We consider social-media discussions around a topic that are characterized
by two or more conflicting viewpoints. Let us refer to these viewpoints as campaigns. Our approach
follows the popular paradigm of influence propagation [24]: we want to select a small number
of seed users for each campaign so as to maximize the number of users who are exposed to both
campaigns. In contrast to existing work on competitive viral marketing, we do not consider the
problem of finding an optimal selfish strategy for each campaign separately. Instead we consider a
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certalized agent responsible for balancing information exposure for the two campaings. Consider
the following motivating examples.
Example 1: Prominent social-media companies, like Facebook and Twitter, have been called to
act as arbiters so as to prevent ideological isolation and polarization in the society. The motivation
for companies to assume this role could be for improving their public image or due to government
policies.1 Consider a controversial topic being discussed in social-media platform X , which has
led to polarization and filter bubbles. Platform X has the ability to algorithmically detect such
bubbles [16], identify the influential users on each side, and estimate the influence among users [14,
19]. As part of a new filter-bubble bursting service, platform X would like to disseminate two high-
quality and thought-provoking dueling op-eds, articles, one for each side, that present the arguments
of the other side in a fair manner. Assume that X is interested in following a viral-marketing
approach. Which users should X target, for each of the two articles, so that people in the network
are informed in the most balanced way?
Example 2: Government organization Y is initiating a programme to help assimilate foreigners
who have newly arrived in the country. Part of the initiative focuses on bringing the communities of
foreigners and locals closer in social media. Organization Y is interested in identifying individuals
who can help spreading news of one community into the other.
From the technical standpoint, we consider the following problem setting: We assume that informa-
tion is propagated in the network according to the independent-cascade model [24]. We assume that
there are two opposing campaigns, and for each one there is a set of initial seed nodes, I1 and I2,
which are not necessarily distinct. Furthermore, we assume that the users in the network are exposed
to information about campaign i via diffusion from the set of seed nodes Ii. The diffusion in the
network may occur with independent or correlated probabilities for the two campaigns; we consider
both settings to which we are referring as heterogeneous or correlated.
The objective is to recruit two additional sets of seed nodes, S1 and S2, for the two campaigns, with
|S1| + |S2| ≤ k, for a given budget k, so as to maximize the expected number of balanced users,
i.e., the users who are exposed to information from both campaigns (or from none!).
We formally define the problem of balancing information exposure and we show that it isNP-hard.
We develop different approximation algorithms for the different settings we consider, as well as
heuristic variants of the proposed algorithm. We experimentally evaluate our methods, on several
real-world (and realistic) datasets, collected from twitter, for different topics of interest.
Although our approach is inspired by the large body of work on information propagation, and resem-
bles previous problem formulations for competitive viral marketing, there are significant differences
and novelties. In particular:
• This is the first paper to address the problem of balancing information exposure and breaking
filter bubbles, using the information-propagation methodology.
• The objective function that best suits our problem setting is related to the size of the symmetric
difference of users exposed to the two campaigns. This is in contrast to previous settings that
consider functions related to the size of the coverage of the campaigns.
• As a technical consequence of the previous point, our objective function is neither monotone
nor submodular making our problem more challenging. Yet we are able to analyze the problem
structure and provide algorithms with approximation guarantees.
• While most previous papers consider selfish agents, and provide bounds on best-response strate-
gies (i.e., move of the last player), we consider a centralized setting and provide bounds for a
global objective function.
We note that our datasets and implementation is publicly available.2
1For instance, Germany is now fining Facebook for the spread of fake news.
2https://users.ics.aalto.fi/kiran/BalanceExposure/
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2 Related Work
Detecting and breaking filter bubbles. Several studies have observed that users in online social
networks prefer to associate with like-minded individuals and consume agreeable content. This
phenomenon leads to filter bubbles, echo chambers [36, 35], and to online polarization [1, 2, 5, 12,
16, 22, 30]. Once these filter bubbles are detected, the next step is to try to overcome them. One
way to achieve this is by making recommendations to individuals of opposing viewpoints. This idea
has been explored, in different ways, by a number of studies in the literature [17, 26, 27, 31, 39].
However, all previous studies address the problem of breaking filter bubbles by the means of content
recommendation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that considers an information
diffusion approach.
Information diffusion. Following a large body of work, we model diffusion using the independent-
cascade model [24]. In the basic model a single item propagates in the network. An extension is
when multiple items propagate simultaneously. All works that study optimization problems in the
case of multiple items, consider that items compete for being adopted by users. In other words, every
user adopts at most one of the existing items and participates in at most one cascade.
Myers and Leskovec [32] argue that spreading processes may either cooperate or compete. Compet-
ing contagions decrease each other’s probability of diffusion, while cooperating ones help each other
in being adopted. They propose a model that quantifies how different spreading cascades interact
with each other. Carnes et al. [11] propose two models for competitive diffusion. Subsequently,
several other models have been proposed [4, 7, 9, 15, 23, 25, 29, 38].
Most of the work on competitive information diffusion consider the problem of selecting the best k
seeds for one campaign, for a given objective, in the presence of competing campaigns [6, 10, 34].
Bharathi et al. [6] show that, if all campaigns but one have fixed sets of seeds, the problem for
selecting the seeds for the last player is submodular, and thus, obtain an approximation algorithm
for the strategy of the last player. Game theoretic aspects of competitive cascades in social net-
works, including the investigation of conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium, have also
been studied [3, 21, 37].
The work that is most related to ours, in the sense of considering a centralized authority, is the
one by Borodin et al. [8]. They study the problem where multiple campaigns wish to maximize
their influence by selecting a set of seeds with bounded cardinality. They propose a centralized
mechanism to allocate sets of seeds (possibly overlapping) to the campaigns so as to maximize the
social welfare, defined as the sum of the individual’s selfish objective functions. One can choose
any objective functions as long as it is submodular and non-decreasing. Under this assumption
they provide strategyproof (truthful) algorithms that offer guarantees on the social welfare. Their
framework applies for several competitive influence models. In our case, the number of balanced
users is not submodular, and so we do not have any approximation guarantees. Nevertheless, we can
use this framework as a heuristic baseline, which we do in the experimental section.
3 Problem Definition
Preliminaries: We start with a directed graph G = (V,E, p1, p2) representing a social network.
We assume that there are two distinct campaigns that propagate through the network. Each edge
e = (u, v) ∈ E is assigned two probabilities, p1(e) and p2(e), representing the probability that a
post from vertex u will propagate (e.g., it will be reposted) to vertex v in the respective campaigns.
Cascade model: We assume that information on the two campaigns propagates in the network
following the independent-cascade model [24]. For instance, consider the propagation of the first
campaign. The procedure for the second campaign is analogous. We assume that there exists a set of
seeds I1 from which the propagation process begins. These are vertices in the network that support
the campaign and are active in generating content in favor of the campaign. Propagation in the
independent-cascade model proceeds in rounds. At each round, there exists a set of active vertices
A1 (initially, A1 = I1), where each vertex u ∈ A1 attempts to activate each vertex v /∈ A1, such
that (u, v) ∈ E, with probability p1(u, v). If the propagation attempt from a vertex u to a vertex v
is successful, we say that v propagates the first campaign. At the end of each round, A1 is set to be
the set of vertices that propagated the campaign during the current round.
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Given a seed set S, we write r1(S) and r2(S) for the vertices that are reached from S using the
aforementioned cascade process, for the respective campaign. Note that since this process is random,
both r1(S) and r2(S) are random variables. Computing the expected number of active vertices is
a #P-hard problem, however, we can approximate it within an arbitrary small factor , with high
probability, via Monte-Carlo simulations. Due to this obstacle, all approximation algorithms that
evaluate an objective function over diffusion processes immediately reduce their approximation by
an additive . Throughout this work we avoid repeating this fact for the sake of simplicity of the
notation.
Heterogeneous vs. correlated propagations: Our model needs also to specify how the propagation
on the two campaigns interact with each other. We consider two settings: In the first setting, we
assume that the campaign messages propagate independently of each other. Given an edge e =
(u, v), the vertex v is activated on the first campaign with probability p1(e), given that vertex u is
activated on the first campaign. Similarly, v is activated on the second campaign with probability
p2(e), given that u is activated on the second campaign. We refer to this setting as heterogeneous.3
In the second setting we assume that p1(e) = p2(e), for each edge e. We further assume that the
coin flips for the propagation of the two campaigns are totally correlated. Namely, consider an edge
e = (u, v), where u is reached by either or both campaigns. Then with probability p1(e), any
campaign that has reached u, will also reach v. We refer to this second setting as correlated.
Note that in both settings, a vertex may be active by none, either, or both campaigns. This is in
contrast to most existing work in competitive viral marketing, where it is assumed that a vertex can
be activated by at most one campaign. The intuition is that in our setting activation means merely
passing a message or posting an article, and it does not imply full commitment to the campaign. We
also note that the heterogeneous setting is more realistic than the correlated, however, we also study
the correlated model as it is mathematically simpler.
Problem definition: We are now ready to state our problem for balancing information exposure
(BALANCE). Given a directed graph, initial seed sets for both campaigns and a budget, we ask to
find additional seeds that would balance the vertices. More formally:
Problem 3.1 (BALANCE). Let G = (V,E, p1, p2) be a directed graph, and two sets I1 and I2 of
initial seeds of the two campaigns. Assume that we are given a budget k. Find two sets S1 and S2,
where |S1|+ |S2| ≤ k maximizing
Φ(S1, S2) = E[|V \ (r1(I1 ∪ S1)4 r2(I2 ∪ S2))|] .
The objective function Φ(S1, S2) is the expected number of vertices that are either reached by both
campaigns or remain oblivious to both campaigns. Problem 3.1 is defined for both settings, het-
erogeneous and correlated. When we need to make explicit the underlying setting we refer to the
respective problems by BALANCE-H and BALANCE-C. When referring to BALANCE-H, we denote
the objective by ΦH . Similarly, when referring to BALANCE-C, we write ΦC . We drop the indices,
when we are referring to both models simultaneously.
Computational complexity: As expected, the optimization problem BALANCE turns out to be
NP-hard for both settings, heterogeneous and correlated. A straightforward way to prove it is by
setting I2 = V , so the problems reduce to standard influence maximization. However, we provide
a stronger result. Note that instead of maximizing balanced vertices we can equivalently minimize
the imbalanced vertices. However, this turns to be a more difficult problem.
Proposition 1. Assume a graph G = (V,E, p1, p2) with two sets I1 and I2 and a budget k. It is
an NP-hard problem to decide whether there are sets S1 and S2 such that |S1| + |S2| ≤ k and
E[|r1(I1 ∪ S1)4 r2(I2 ∪ S2)|] = 0.
Proof. To prove the hardness we will use SET COVER. Here, we are given a universe U and family
of sets C1, . . . , C`, and we are asked to select k sets covering the universe U .
To map this instance to our problem, we first define vertex set V to consist of 3 parts, V1, V2
and V3. The first part corresponds to the universe U . The second part consists of k copies of `
vertices, ith vertex in jth copy corresponds to Ci. The third part consists of k vertices bj . The edges
3Although independent is probably a better term than heterogeneous, we adopt the latter to avoid any con-
fusion with the independent-cascade model.
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are as follows: a vertex v in the jth copy, corresponding to a set Ci is connected to the vertices
corresponding to the elements in Ci, furthermore v is connected to bj . We set p1 = p2 = 1. The
initial seeds are I1 = ∅ and I2 = V1 ∪ V3. We set the budget to 2k.
Assume that there is a k-cover, Ci1 , . . . , Cik . We set
S1 = S2 =
{
vertex corresponding to Cij in jth copy
}
.
It is easy to see that the imbalanced vertices in I2 are exposed to the first campaign. Moreover, S1
and S2 do not introduce new imbalanced vertices. This makes the objective equals to 0.
Assume that there exists a solution S1 and S2 with a zero cost. We claim that |S1 ∩ (V1 ∪ V2)| ≤ k.
To prove this, first note that S1 ∩ V2 = S2 ∩ V2, as otherwise vertices in V2 are left unbalanced. Let
m = |S1 ∩ V2|. Since V3 must be balanced and each vertex in V2 has only one edge to a vertex in
V3, there at least k vertices in |S1 ∩ {V2 ∪ V3}|, that is, we must have |S1 ∩ V3| ≥ k −m. Let us
write dij = |Si ∩ Vj |. The budget constraints guarantee that
d11 + d12 + d22 + d13 ≤
∑
ij
dij ≤ 2k,
which can be rewritten as
d11 + d12 ≤ 2k − d22 − d13 ≤ 2k −m− (k −m) = k.
Construct C as follows: for each S1 ∩ V2, select the set that correponds to the vertex, for each
S1∩V1, select any set that contain this vertex (there is always at least one set, otherwise the problem
is trivially false). Since V1 must be balanced, C is a k-cover of U .
This result holds for both models, even when p1 = p2 = 1. This result implies that the minimization
version of the problem is NP-hard, and there is no algorithm with multiplicative approximation
guarantee. It also implies that BALANCE-H and BALANCE-C are also NP-hard. However, we will
see later that we can obtain approximation guarantees for these maximization problems.
4 Greedy algorithms yielding approximation guarantees
In this section we propose three greedy algorithms. The first algorithm yields an approximation
guarantee of (1 − 1/e)/2 for both models. The remaining two algorithms yield a guarantee for the
correlated model only.
Decomposing the objective: Recall that the objective function of the BALANCE problem is
Φ(S1, S2). In order to show that this function admits an approximation guarantee, we decompose it
into two components. To do that, assume that we are given initial seeds I1 and I2, and let us write
X = r1(I1) ∪ r2(I2), Y = V \X. Here X are vertices reached by any initial seed in the two cam-
paigns and Y are the vertices that are not reached at all. Note that X and Y are random variables.
Since X and Y partition V , we can decompose the score Φ(S1, S2) as
Φ(S1, S2) = Ω(S1, S2) + Ψ(S1, S2), where
Ω(S1, S2) = E[|X \ (r1(I1 ∪ S1)4 r2(I2 ∪ S2))|] ,
Ψ(S1, S2) = E[|Y \ (r1(I1 ∪ S1)4 r2(I2 ∪ S2))|] .
We first show that Ω(S1, S2) is monotone and submodular. It is well-known that for maximizing
a function that has these two properties under a size constraint, the greedy algorithm computes an
(1− 1e ) approximate solution [33].
Lemma 2. Ω(S1, S2) is monotone and submodular.
Before providing the proof, as a technicality, note that submodularity is usually defined for functions
with one argument. Namely, given a universe of itemsU , we consider functions of the type f : 2U →
R. However, by taking U = V × {1, 2} we can equivalently write our objectives as functions with
one argument, i.e., Φ,Ω,Ψ : 2U → R.
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Proof. The objective counts 3 types of vertices: (i) vertices covered by both initial seeds, (ii) addi-
tional vertices covered by I1 and S2, and (iii) additional vertices covered by I2 and S1. This allows
us to decompose the objective as
Ω(S1, S2) = E[|A|+ |B|+ |C|] , where
A = r1(I1) ∩ r2(I2), B = (r1(I1) \ r2(I2)) ∩ r2(S2), C = (r2(I2) \ r1(I1)) ∩ r1(S1).
Note that A does not depend on S1 and S2. B grows in size as we add more vertices to S2, and C
grows in size as we add more vertices to S1. This proves that the objective is monotone.
To prove the submodularity, let us introduce some notation: given a set of edges F , we write r(S;F )
to be the set of vertices that can be reached from S via F . This allows us to define
A(F1, F2) = r(I1;F1) ∩ r(I2;F2),
B(F1, F2) = (r(I1;F1) \ r(I2;F2)) ∩ r(S2;F2),
C(F1, F2) = (r(I2;F2) \ r(I1;F1)) ∩ r(S1;F1).
The score Ω(S1, S2) can be rewritten as∑
F1,F2
p(F1, F2)(|A(F1, F2)|+ |B(F1, F2)|+ |C(F1, F2)|),
where p(F1, F2) is the probability of F1 being the realization of the edges for the first campaign and
F2 being the realization of the edges for the second campaign.
The first term A(F1, F2) does not depend on S1 or S2. The second term is submodular as a function
of S2 and does not depend of S1. The third term is submodular as a function of S1 and does not de-
pend of S2. Since any linear combination of submodular function weighted by positive coefficients
is also submodular, this completes the proof.
We are ready to discuss our algorithms.
Algorithm 0: ignore Ψ. Our first algorithm is very simple: instead of maximizing Φ, we maximize
Ω, i.e., we ignore any vertices that are made imbalanced during the process. Since Ω is submodular
and monotone we can use the greedy algorithm. If we then compare the obtained result with the
empty solution, we get the promised approximation guarantee. We refer to this algorithm as Cover.
Proposition 3. Let 〈S∗1 , S∗2 〉 be the optimal solution maximizing Φ. Let 〈S1, S2〉 be the solution
obtained via greedy algorithm maximizing Ω. Then
max{Φ(S1, S2),Φ(∅, ∅)} ≥ 1− 1/e
2
Φ(S∗1 , S
∗
2 ).
Proof. Write c = 1 − 1/e. Let 〈S′1, S′2〉 be the optimal solution maximizing Ω. Lemma 2 shows
that Ω(S1, S2) ≥ cΩ(S′1, S′2).
Note that Ψ(∅, ∅) ≥ Ψ(S∗1 , S∗2 ) as the first term is the average of vertices not affected by the initial
seeds. Thus,
Φ(S∗1 , S
∗
2 ) = Ω(S
∗
1 , S
∗
2 ) + Ψ(S
∗
1 , S
∗
2 ) ≤ Ω(S′1, S′2) + Ψ(S∗1 , S∗2 )
≤ Ω(S′1, S′2) + Ψ(∅, ∅) ≤ Ω(S1, S2)/c+ Ψ(∅, ∅)
≤ Ω(S1, S2)/c+ Ψ(∅, ∅)/c
≤ (2/c) max{Ω(S1, S2),Ψ(∅, ∅)}
≤ (2/c) max{Φ(S1, S2),Φ(∅, ∅)},
which completes the proof.
Algorithm 1: force common seeds. Ignoring the Ψ term may prove costly as it is possible to
introduce a lot of new imbalanced vertices. The idea behind the second algorithm is to force Ψ = 0.
We do this by either adding the same seeds to both campaigns, or adding a seed that is covered
by an opposing campaign. This algorithm has guarantees only in the correlated setting with even
budget k but in practice we can use the algorithm also for the heterogeneous setting. We refer to this
algorithm as Common and the pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1.
We first show in the following lemma that adding common seeds may halve the score, in the worst
case. Then, we use this lemma to prove the approximation guarantee
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Algorithm 1: Common, greedy algorithm that only adds common seeds
1 S1 ← S2 ← ∅;
2 while |S1|+ |S2| ≤ k do
3 c← arg maxc Φ(S1 ∪ {c} , S2 ∪ {c});
4 s1 ← arg maxs∈I1 Φ(S1, S2 ∪ {s});
5 s2 ← arg maxs∈I2 Φ(S1 ∪ {s} , S2);
6 add the best option among 〈c, c〉, 〈∅, s1〉, 〈s2, ∅〉 to 〈S1, S2〉 while respecting the budget.
Lemma 4. Let 〈S1, S2〉 be a solution to BALANCE-C, with an even budget k. There exists a solution
〈S′1, S′2〉 with S′1 = S′2 such that ΦC (S′1, S′2) ≥ ΦC (S1, S2)/2.
Proof. As we are dealing with the correlated setting, we can write r(S) = r1(S) = r2(S). Our first
step is to decompose ω = ΦC (S1, S2) into several components. To do so, we partition the vertices
based on their reachability from the initial seeds,
A = r(I1) ∩ r(I2), B = r(I1) \ r(I2),
C = r(I2) \ r(I1), D = V \ (r(I1) ∪ r(I2)).
Note that these are all random variables. If S1 = S2 = ∅, then ΦC (S1, S2) = EC [|A|+ |D|]. More
generally, S1 may balance some vertices in C, and S2 may balance some vertices in B. We may
also introduce new imbalanced vertices in D. To take this into account we define
B′ = B ∩ r(S2), C ′ = C ∩ r(S1),
D′ = D \ (r(S1)4 r(S2)).
We can express the cost of ΦC (S1, S2) as
ω = ΦC (S1, S2) = EC [|A|+ |B′|+ |C ′|+ |D′|] .
Split S1 ∪ S2 in two equal-size sets, T and Q, and define
ω1 = ΦC (T, T ), ω2 = ΦC (Q,Q).
We claim that ω ≤ ω1 + ω2. This proves the proposition, since ω1 + ω2 ≤ 2 max{ω1, ω2}.
To prove the claim let us first split T and Q,
T1 = T ∩ S1, T2 = T ∩ S2, Q1 = Q ∩ S1, Q2 = Q ∩ S2.
Our next step is to decompose ω1 and ω2, similar to ω. To do that, we define
B1 = B ∩ r(T2), B2 = B ∩ r(Q2),
C1 = C ∩ r(T1), C2 = C ∩ r(Q1).
Note that, the pair 〈T, T 〉 does not introduce new imbalanced nodes. This leads to
ω1 = ΦC (T, T ) = EC [|A|+ |B1|+ |C1|+ |D|] ,
and similarly,
ω2 = ΦC (Q,Q) = EC [|A|+ |B2|+ |C2|+ |D|] .
To prove ω ≤ ω1 + ω2, note that |D′| ≤ |D|. In addition,
|B′| = |B ∩ (r(T2) ∪ r(Q2))|
≤ |B ∩ r(T2)|+ |B ∩ r(Q2)| = |B1|+ |B2|
and
|C ′| = |C ∩ (r(T1) ∪ r(Q1))|
≤ |C ∩ r(T1)|+ |C ∩ r(Q1)| = |C1|+ |C2|.
Combining these inequalities proves the proposition.
It is easy to see that the greedy algorithm satisfies the conditions of the following proposition.
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Proposition 5. Assume an iterative algorithm where at each iteration, we add one or two vertices
to our solution until our constraints are met. Let Si1, S
i
2 be the sets after the i-th iteration, S
0
1 =
S02 = ∅. Let ηi = ΦC (Si1, Si2) be the cost after the i-th iteration. Assume that ηi ≥ ηi−1. Assume
further that for i = 1, . . . , k/2 it holds that ηi ≥ ΦC (Si−11 ∪ {c} , Si−12 ∪ {c}). Then the algorithm
yields (1− 1/e)/2 approximation.
To prove the proposition, we need the following technical lemma, which is a twist of a standard
technique for proving the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm on submodular functions.
Lemma 6. Assume a universe U . Let f : 2U → R be a positive function. Let T ⊆ U be a
set with k elements. Let C0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ck be a sequence of subsets of U . Assume that f(Ci) ≥
maxt∈T f(Ci−1 ∪ {t}).
Assume further that for each i = 1, . . . , k, we can decompose f as f = gi + hi such that
1. gi is submodular and monotonically increasing function,
2. hi(W ) = hi(Ci−1), for any W ⊆ T ∪ Ci−1.
Then f(Ck) ≥ (1− 1/e)f(T ).
Proof. The assumptions of the propositions imply
f(T ) = gi(T ) + hi(T )
= gi(T ) + hi(Ci−1)
≤ gi(Ci−1) + hi(Ci−1) +
∑
t∈T
gi(Ci−1 ∪ {t})− gi(Ci−1)
= f(Ci−1) +
∑
t∈T
hi(Ci−1) + gi(Ci−1 ∪ {t})− gi(Ci−1)− hi(Ci−1)
= f(Ci−1) +
∑
t∈T
hi(Ci−1 ∪ {t}) + gi(Ci−1 ∪ {t})− gi(Ci−1)− hi(Ci−1)
= f(Ci−1) +
∑
t∈T
f(Ci−1 ∪ {t})− f(Ci−1)
≤ f(Ci−1) + k(f(Ci)− f(Ci−1)),
where the first inequality is due to the submodularity of gi, and is a standard trick to prove the
approximation ratio for the greedy algorithm.
We can rewrite the above inequality as
kf(T ) + (1− k)f(T ) = f(T ) ≤ f(Ci−1) + k(f(Ci)− f(Ci−1)).
Rearranging the terms leads to
k − 1
k
(f(Ci−1)− f(T )) ≤ f(Ci)− f(T ) .
Applying induction over i, yields
f(Ck)− f(T ) ≥
(
k − 1
k
)k
(f(C0)− f(T )) ≥ 1
e
(f(C0)− f(T )) ≥ −f(T )/e,
leading to f(Ck) ≥ (1− 1/e)f(T ).
We can now prove the main claim. Note that since we are using the correlated model, we have
r1 = r2. For notational simplicity, we will write r = r1 = r2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let OPT be the cost of the optimal solution. Let D be the solution maxi-
mizing ΦC (D,D) with |D| ≤ k/2. Lemma 4 guarantees that OPT/2 ≤ ΦC (D,D).
In order to apply Lemma 6, we first define the universe U as
U = {〈u, v〉 | u, v ∈ V } ∪ {〈v, ∅〉 | v ∈ V } ∪ {〈∅, v〉 | v ∈ V } .
8
The sets are defined as
Ci =
{〈v, ∅〉 | v ∈ Si1} ∪ {〈∅, v〉 | v ∈ Si2} .
Given a set C ⊆ U , let us define pi1(C) = {v | 〈v, u〉 ∈ C, v 6= ∅} to be the union of the first entries
in C. Similarly, define pi2(C) = {v | 〈u, v〉 ∈ C, v 6= ∅}.
We can now define f as f(C) = ΦC (pi1(C), pi2(C)). To decompose f , let us first write
Xi = r(I1 ∪ pi1(Ci−1)) ∪ r(I2 ∪ pi2(Ci−1)) = r(I1 ∪ Si−11 ) ∪ r(I2 ∪ Si−12 ), Yi = V \Xi.
and set
gi(C) = E[|Xi \ (r(I1 ∪ pi1(C))4 r(I2 ∪ pi2(C)))|] ,
hi(C) = E[|Yi \ (r(I1 ∪ pi1(C))4 r(I2 ∪ pi2(C)))|] .
Finally, we set T = {〈d, d〉 | d ∈ D}.
First note that f = gi+hi since Xi∩Yi = ∅. The proof of Lemma 2 shows that gi is monotonically
increasing and submodular.
Let C ⊆ Ci−1 ∪ T . If there is a vertex v in r(I1 ∪ pi1(C)) but not in Xi, then this means v was
influenced by d ∈ D. Since d ∈ pi2(C), we have v ∈ r(I2 ∪ pi2(C)). That is,
r(I1 ∪ pi1(C)) \Xi = r(I2 ∪ pi2(C)) \Xi.
Since Yi and Xi are disjoint, this gives us
hi(C) = E[|Yi \ (r(I1 ∪ pi1(C))4 r(I2 ∪ pi2(C)))|]
= E[|Yi \ ((r(I1 ∪ pi1(C)) \Xi)4 (r(I2 ∪ pi2(C)) \Xi))|]
= E[|Yi|] .
That is, hi(C) is constant for any C ⊆ Ci−1 ∪ T . Thus, hi(C) = hi(Ci−1).
Finally, the assumpion of the proposition guarantees that f(Ci) ≥ f(Ci−1 ∪ {t}), for t ∈ T .
Thus, these definitions meet all the prerequisites of Lemma 6, guaranteeing that
(1− 1/e)ΦC (D,D) ≤ ΦC (Sk/21 , Sk/22 ) ≤ ΦC (Sk1 , Sk2 ).
Since OPT/2 ≤ ΦC (D,D), the result follows.
Algorithm 2: common seeds as baseline. Not allowing new imbalanced vertices may prove to be
too restrictive. We can relax this condition by allowing new imbalanced vertices as long as the gain is
at least as good as adding a common seed. We refer to this algorithm as Hedge and the pseudo-code
is given in Algorithm 2. The approximation guarantee for this algorithm—in the correlated setting
and with even budget—follows immediately from Proposition 5 as it also satisfies the conditions.
Algorithm 2: Hedge, greedy algorithm, where each step is as good as adding the best common seed
1 S1 ← S2 ← ∅;
2 while |S1|+ |S2| ≤ k do
3 c← arg maxc Φ(S1 ∪ {c} , S2 ∪ {c});
4 s1 ← arg maxs Φ(S1, S2 ∪ {s});
5 s2 ← arg maxs Φ(S1 ∪ {s} , S2);
6 add the best option among 〈c, c〉, 〈∅, s1〉, 〈s2, ∅〉, 〈s2, s1〉, to 〈S1, S2〉 while respecting the
budget.
5 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithms on real-world datasets. We focus
on (i) analyzing the quality of the seeds picked by our algorithms in comparison to other heuristic
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Table 1: Dataset statistics. The column |C| refers to the average number of edges in a randomly
generated cascade in the correlated case, while |C1| and |C2| refer to average number of edges
generated in a cascade of the campaigns 1 and 2, respectively, in the heterogeneous case.
Dataset # Nodes # Edges |C| |C1| |C2|
Abortion 279 505 671 144 2 105 326 1 801
Brexit 22 745 48 830 476 113 390
Fracking 374 403 1 377 085 4 156 1 595 3 103
iPhone 36 742 49 248 4 776 339 4 478
ObamaCare 334 617 1 511 670 6 614 2 404 4 527
US-elections 80 544 921 368 4 697 3 097 12 044
approaches and baselines; (ii) analyzing the efficiency and the scalability of our algorithms; and
(iii) providing anecdotal examples of the obtained results.
For all experiments we report averages over 1 000 random simulations of the cascade process. As
argued by Kempe et al. [24], a random cascade can be generated in advance by sampling each edge
e with probability p1(e) or p2(e), depending on the model and the campaign. In all experiments we
set k to range between 5 and 50 with a step of 5.
Datasets: To evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithms, we run experiments on real-world data
collected from twitter. Let G = (V,E) be the twitter follower graph. A directed edge (u, v) ∈ E
indicates that user v follows u; note that the edge direction indicates the “information flow” from
a user to their followers. We define a cascade GX = (X,EX) as a graph over the set of users
X ⊆ V who have retweeted at least one hashtag related to a topic (e.g., US elections). An edge
(u, v) ∈ EX ⊆ E indicates that v retweeted u.
We use datasets from six topics with opposing viewpoints, covering politics (US-elections,
Brexit, ObamaCare), policy (Abortion, Fracking), and lifestyle (iPhone, focusing on iPhone
vs. Samsung). All datasets are collected by filtering the twitter streaming API (1% random sample
of all tweets) for a set of keywords used in previous work [28]. For each dataset, we identify two
sides (indicating the two view-points) on the retweet graph, which has been shown to capture best
the two opposing sides of a controversy [16]. Details on the statistics of the dataset are shown in
Table 1.
After building the graphs, we need to estimate the diffusion probabilities for the heterogeneous
and correlated models. Note that the estimation of the diffusion probabilities is orthogonal to our
contribution in this paper. For the sake of concreteness we have used the approach described below.
One could use a different, more advanced, method; our methods are still applicable.
Let q1(v) and q2(v) be an a priori probability of a user v retweeting sides 1 and 2, respectively.
These are measured from the data by looking at how often a user retweets content from users and
keywords that are discriminative of each side. For example, for US-elections, the discriminative
users and keywords for side Hillary would be @hillaryclinton and #imwither, and for Trump, @real-
donaldtrump and #makeamericagreatagain. Additional details on data collection, and user/keyword
sets for side identification are given in Table 2 in Appendix A.
The probability that user v retweets user u (cascade probability) is then defined as
pi(u, v) = α qi(v) + (1− α)
(
R(u, v) + 1
R(v) + 2
)
, i = 1, 2,
where R(u, v) is the number of times v has retweeted u, and R(v) is the total number of retweets
of user v. The cascade probabilities pi capture the fact that users retweet content if they see it from
their friends (term R(u,v)+1R(v)+2 ) or based on their own biases (term qi(v)). The additive terms in the
numerator and denominator provide an additive smoothing by Laplace’s rule of succession.
We set the value of α to 0.8 for the heterogeneous setting. For the correlated setting, α is set to zero.
Baselines. We use 5 different baselines. The first baseline, BBLO, is an adaptation of the framework
by Borodin et al. [8]. This framework requires an objective function as an input, and here we
use our objective function Φ. The framework works as follows: The two campaigns are given
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Figure 1: Expected symmetric difference n− ΦC as a function of the budget k. Top row, heteroge-
neous model, bottom row: Correlated model. Low values are better.
a budget k/2 on the number of seeds that they can select. At each round, we select a vertex v
optimizing Φ(S1 ∪ {v} , S2), the vertex v is added to S1, and then we select a vertex w optimizing
Φ(S1, S2 ∪ {w}), which is added to S2. We should stress that the theoretical guarantees by [8] do
not apply because our objective is not submodular. Thus, BBLO is a heuristic.
The next two heuristics add a set of common seeds to both campaigns. We run a greedy algorithm
for campaign i = 1, 2 to select the set S′i with the `  k vertices Pi that optimizes the function
ri(S
′
i ∪ Ii). We consider two heuristics: Union selects S1 and S2 to be equal to the k/2 first distinct
vertices in S′1 ∪ S′2 while Intersection selects S1 and S2 to be equal to k/2 first vertices in S′1 ∩ S′2.
Here the vertices are ordered based on their discovery time. In both cases we (arbitrarily) break ties
in favor of campaign 1.
Finally, HighDegree selects the vertices with the largest number of followers and assigns them alter-
nately to the two cascades; and Random assigns k/2 random seeds to each campaign.
In addition to the baselines, we also consider a simple greedy algorithm Greedy. The difference
between Cover and Greedy is that, in each iteration, Cover adds the seed that maximizes Ω, while
Greedy adds the seed that maximizes Φ. We can only show an approximation guarantee for Cover
but Greedy is a more intuitive approach as it considers directly the number of balanced vertices and
we use it as a heuristic.
Comparison of the algorithms. We start by evaluating the quality of the sets of seeds computed by
our algorithms, i.e., the number of equally-informed vertices.
Heterogeneous setting. We consider first the case of heterogeneous networks. The results for the
selected datasets are shown in Figure 1. Full results are shown in Appendix A. Instead of plotting
Φ, we plot the number of the remaining unbalanced vertices, n−Φ, as it makes the results easier to
distinguish; i.e., an optimal solution achieves the value 0.
The first observation is that the approximation algorithm Cover performs, in general, worse than
the other two heuristics. This is due to the fact that Cover does not optimize directly the objective
function. Hedge performs better than Greedy, in general, since it examines additional choices to
select. The only deviation from this picture is for the US-elections dataset, where the Greedy
outperforms Hedge by a small factor. This may due to the fact that while Hedge has more options,
it allocates seeds in batches of two.
The algorithms seem to follow a diminishing-returns behavior, on most cases. This behavior appears
despite the fact that the optimization function is not submodular.
Correlated setting. Next we consider correlated networks. We experiment with the three approx-
imation algorithms Cover, Common, Hedge, and the heuristic Greedy. The results are shown in
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Figure 1. Cover performs again the worst since it is the only method that introduces new unbalanced
vertices without caring about their cardinality. Its variant, Greedy, performs much better in practice
even though it does not provide an approximation guarantee. The algorithms Common, Greedy, and
Hedge perform very similar to each other without a clear winner.
Comparison with baselines. Our next step is to compare against the baselines. For simplicity, we
focus on k = 20; the overall conclucions hold for other budgets. The results for Hedge versus the
five baselines are shown in Figure 2.
From the results we see that BBLO is the best competitor: its scores are the closest to Hedge, and
it receives slightly better scores in 3 out of 12 cases. The competitiveness is not surprising because
we specifically set the objective function in BBLO to be Φ(S1, S2). The Intersection and Union
also perform well but are always worse than Hedge. Random is unpredictable but always worse
than Hedge. In the case of heterogeneous networks, Hedge selects seeds that leave less unbalanced
vertices, by a factor of two on average, compared to the seeds selected by the HighDegree method.
For correlated networks, our method outperforms the two baselines by an order of magnitude.
Running time. We proceed to evaluate the efficiency and the scalability of our algorithms. The
running times, in seconds, of our algorithms, for all datasets and for k = 20, are shown in Figure 5
in Appendix A as a function of network size. We observe that all algorithms have comparable
running times and good scalability.
Use case with Fracking. We present a qualitative case-study analysis for the seeds selected by
our algorithm. We highlight the Fracking dataset, even though we applied similar analysis to the
other datasets as well (the results are given in Figure 6 in Appendix A). Recall that for each dataset
we identify two sides with opposing views, and a set of initial seeds for each side (I1 and I2). We
consider the users in the initial seeds I1 (side supporting fracking), and summarize the text of all their
Twitter profile descriptions in a word cloud. The result, as can be seen in Figure 6 in Appendix A,
contains words that are used to emphasize the benefits of fracking (energy, oil, gas, etc.). We then
draw a similar word cloud for the users identified by the Hedge algorithm as seed nodes in the sets
S1 and S2 (k = 50). The result, shown in Figure 6 in Appendix A, contains a more balanced set of
words, which includes many words used to underline the environmental dangers of fracking.
6 Conclusion
We presented the first study of the problem of balancing information exposure in social networks
using techniques from the area of information diffusion. Our approach has several novel aspects. In
particular, we formulate our problem by seeking to optimize a symmetric difference function, which
is neither monotone nor submodular, and thus, not amenable to existing approaches. Additionally,
while previous studies consider a setting with selfish agents and provide bounds on best-response
strategies (i.e., move of the last player), we consider a centralized setting and provide bounds for a
global objective function.
Our work provides several directions for future work. One interesting problem is to improve the
approximation guarantee for the problem we define. Second, we would like to extend the problem
definition for more than two campaigns and design approximation algorithms for that case.
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A Additional tables and figures related to the experimental evaluation
Table 2: Dataset descriptions, as well as tags and rewteets that were used to collect the data.
USelections: Tweets containing hashtags and keywords identifying the USElections, such as
#uselections, #trump2016, #hillary2016, etc. Collected using Twitter 1% sample for 2 weeks in
September 2016
Pro-Hillary Pro-Trump
RT @hillaryclinton, #hillary2016, #clin-
tonkaine2016, #imwithher
RT @realdonaldtrump, #makeamericagreata-
gain, #trumppence16, #trump2016
Brexit: Tweets containing hashtags #brexit, #voteremain, #voteleave, #eureferendum for all
of June 2016, from the 1% Twitter sample.
Pro-Remain Pro-Leave
#voteremain, #strongerin, #remain, #re-
maineu, #votein
#voteleave, #strongerout, #leaveeu, #takecon-
trol, #leave, #voteout
Abortion: Tweets containing hashtags #abortion, #prolife, #prochoice, #anti-abortion, #pro-
abortion, #plannedparenthood from Oct 2011 to Aug 2016.
Pro-Choice Pro-Life
RT @thinkprogress, RT @komenforthe-
cure, RT @mentalabortions, #waronwomen,
#nbprochoice, #prochoice, #standwithpp,
#reprorights
RT @stevenertelt, RT @lifenewshq, #pray-
toendabortion, #prolifeyouth, #prolife, #de-
fundplannedparenthood, #defundpp, #unborn-
livesmatter
Obamacare: Tweets containing hashtags #obamacare, and #aca from Oct 2011 to Aug 2016.
Pro-Obamacare Anti-Obamacare
RT @barackobama, RT @lolgop, RT
@charlespgarcia, RT @defendobamacare, RT
@thinkprogress, #obamacares, #enoughal-
ready, #uniteblue
RT @sentedcruz, RT @realdonaldtrump,
RT @mittromney, RT @breitbartnews, RT
@tedcruz, #defundobamacare, #makedclisten,
#fullrepeal, #dontfundit
Fracking: Tweets containing hashtags and keywords #fracking, ’hydraulic fracturing’,
’shale’, ’horizontal drilling’, from Oct 2011 to Aug 2016.
Pro-Fracking Anti-Fracking
RT @shalemarkets, RT @energyindepth, RT
@shalefacts, #fracknation, #frackingez, #oi-
landgas, #greatgasgala, #shalegas
RT @greenpeaceuk, RT @greenpeace, RT
@ecowatch, #environment, #banfracking,
#keepitintheground, #dontfrack, #globalfrack-
down, #stopthefrackattack
iPhone vs. Samsung: Tweets containing hashtags #iphone, and #samsung from April (re-
lease of Samsung Galaxy S7), and September 2015 (release of iPhone 7).
Pro-iPhone Pro-Samsung
#iphone #samsung
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Figure 3: Expected symmetric difference n − ΦH as a function of the budget k. Heterogeneous
model. Low values are better.
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Side 1 Side 2 Hedge
Pro-Choice Pro-Life
Pro-Remain Pro-Leave
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Pro-Obamacare Anti-Obamacare
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Figure 6: Word clouds of the profiles for the initial seeds, and profiles selected by Hedge.
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